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THE 1990SH A V Eseen three large international financial crises shake the
world economy: the collapse of western Europe’s Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism (ERM) in the fall of 1992, the collapse of the Mexican peso in the
winter of 1994–95, and the East Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. Other
crises late in the decade, in Brazil and Russia, did not develop the scope
or reach of these three, even though observers and central bankers at the
time feared that their consequences could become even worse.
1
The European crisis resulted from a standoff in economic policy
between the chancellor and the central bank of Germany, Europe’s largest
economy, over how to finance the enormous reconstruction expenditures
required by the absorption of the former East Germany.
2 The standoff pro-
duced a monetary policy that was too tight for the rest of western Europe
(and, indeed, too tight for Germany). Speculators bet that such tight mon-
etary policies in other western European countries would prove unsus-
tainable, and that political pressures in those countries to devalue their
currencies against the deutsche mark would in the end prove irresistible.
Speculating on the prospective collapse of the ERM thus became a classic
one-way bet. Only even tighter monetary policies for the rest of western
Europe could have provided an incentive not to speculate on the prospec-
tive rise of the mark, yet such policies had an even smaller chance of being
politically sustainable in the long run.
3 In northern Europe, at least, the cri-
sis looked self-fulfilling and self-generated: it was only the belief that
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them inappropriate; in the absence of that belief, policies in those countries
would in all likelihood have been sustainable and appropriate.
4
The second crisis, the collapse of the Mexican peso in the winter of
1994–95, did follow an episode in which monetary policy had been wildly,
unsustainably expansionary throughout 1994. But this episode had been
transitory, linked to the septennial redistribution of wealth and political
favors by the corrupt Institutional Revolutionary Party as the outgoing
president gave way to his chosen successor. Such a transitory burst of
monetary expansion would not normally have been thought to have a sig-
nificant impact on expectations. And whether the peso was overvalued in
real terms as a result of this expansion depended on the long-run rate of
flow of capital from the United States to Mexico. A high rate of inflow
would require a relatively appreciated peso. Indeed, the two years leading
up to the crisis had seen foreign exchange markets place at least as much
upward as downward pressure on the peso’s dollar value.
5
The third crisis, the Asian crisis of 1997–98, has so far proved impos-
sible to ﬁt neatly into the category of ﬁnancial crises generated by macro-
economic instability. That crisis hit countries where the economic
fundamentals were sounder and macroeconomic policies far less subject to
criticism than was the case in either of the other two major crises. Their
economies bore next to no resemblance to the picture painted by Paul
Krugman of an economy vulnerable to currency crisis because it is pur-
suing unsustainable macroeconomic policies.
6 The economies of the Asian
Pacific Rim hit by the crisis—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand—had, as a group, achieved the fastest sus-
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era.
7Yet once investors in New York and elsewhere had decided that they
had invested too large a share of their portfolios in Asia, the rapid shift in
opinion and in capital ﬂows had the same consequences as in Mexico and
western Europe previously.
8
Practically every observer who commented on these successive waves
of crises saw them as symptomatic of deep troubles in the structure of
global ﬁnance. All agreed that if the ﬁnancial system were properly struc-
tured and properly managed, we would not see so many severe crises fol-
lowing wave upon wave. However, diagnoses of the precise ﬂaws in global
financial organization turned out to be all over the map; in the aggregate
they were, in Barry Eichengreen’s polite words, “contradictory and mutu-
ally incompatible.”
9
For example, diagnoses were contradictory and mutually incompatible
with respect to the role played by inappropriate exchange rate flexibility
(or inappropriate exchange rate fixity) in the crisis. Some saw the funda-
mental flaw in the advice of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
emerging market governments to allow their currencies to depreciate dur-
ing the crisis rather than maintain the previous parity against the dollar
no matter what the cost in terms of higher domestic interest rates.
10Yet oth-
ers saw the fundamental ﬂaw in the IMF’s advice to these governments to
raise interest rates to reduce the magnitude of the fall in their currencies’
value.
11
Opinions about the proper role and amount of external assistance were
no less contrary. Some saw the IMF’s willingness to provide assistance to
the distressed economies—albeit at high interest rates and accompanied by
drastic changes in fiscal policy and promised changes in regulatory and
supervisory policy—as itself the fundamental error. Proponents of this
view have argued that it is the availability of IMF support that causes gov-
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ex post minimizes the economic cost. Thus provision of IMF loans to
Mexico in the 1994–95 crisis led investors in East Asia in 1996–97 to
expect that the IMF would bail them out, and the resulting moral hazard
induced the overlending that was at the root of the 1997–98 crisis.
12
But others took the opposite position, namely, that the ﬂaw in the han-
dling of the crisis was that the IMF did not lend enough: that larger loans
with less stringent conditions for longer periods would have allowed the
troubled economies to largely sterilize the panicked wave of capital out-
flows. They could have waited until once again foreign investors were
impressed with their rapid trend growth rates and high rates of physical
capital investment, human capital investment, and technology acquisi-
tion. The oldest rule for lenders of last resort, after all, is to lend freely at
a penalty rate on security that is acceptable in normal times.
13 East Asian
governments and businesses had ample security and collateral that would
have been acceptable in normal times. Senior international agency ofﬁcials
claimed that Mexico’s mid-1990s recession was worse than it might have
been because the funds committed by the United States to dealing with the
crisis—$12 billion or so for one year—were smaller and lent for a shorter
time than they should have been, because of political pressure from Sena-
tor Alfonse D’Amato (R-NY) and the rest of the Republican right. The
same lesson may apply to East Asia.
Finally, some saw the foundations of the crisis in fundamental mis-
takes of long-run policy: the wrong institutions had been built, and growth
would not resume without fundamental institutional reforms. Others, how-
ever, argued that it was premature to condemn Asia’s institutions whole-
sale and demand fundamental reforms in ﬁnancial systems that had fueled
the region’s unprecedented rate of economic growth. To these observers
such a judgment seemed especially premature given economists’limited
knowledge of what the appropriate structure of ﬁnancial institutions really
is, and given the international agencies’lack of experience in the ﬁeld.
14
It is clear that no conceivable amount of abstract argument—and no
practical amount of contemporary evidence—is going to change many
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international ﬁnancial crises that may be coming down the pipeline in the
next decade. There are three major points of disagreement: Are flexible
exchange rates a help or a hindrance? Is IMF support in a crisis a cure or
a cause? And does recovery and a resumption of capital flows require
deep-rooted financial sector reforms to diminish corruption and improve
transparency and corporate governance? The reason why contemporary
evidence will fail to change many minds on these issues is that the criti-
cal points at issue all involve speculation about what would have happened
under different policies. What if the IMF had lent more? What if it had lent
less? What if it had imposed stricter conditions? What if it had been more
lenient? And so on. Yet none of these counterfactual worlds are available
for our inspection. 
Thus it is here that economic history can be useful. For ours is not the
first age of large-scale international capital flows, or of virulent inter-
national financial crises. We today live in what we might well call the
second age of globalization. The first took place during the half-century
before World War I, when free trade, free ﬂows of capital, free migration,
and the classical gold standard all gained increasing strength, and falling
transport and communications costs knit the world economy together and
fueled rapid growth up until the disaster of the world war.
15
In this first era of globalization there was no IMF. There was little
exchange rate variability (or at any rate far less than the world has seen
recently). And financial market organization, as measured by the absence
of corruption and of “crony capitalism,” was certainly no better than it is
today. Capital ﬂows then were as large as capital ﬂows are now relative to
the size of their economies. And these flows were accompanied by fre-
quent international ﬁnancial crises: in the case of the United States, about
once every eight years.
The historical experience reviewed below allows us to draw three
conclusions:
—Large-scale ﬁnancial market reform is not a prerequisite for recovery
and a renewal of capital flows. The experience of the late nineteenth cen-
tury indicates strongly that capital ﬂows will renew—and at a rapid rate—
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information asymmetries and thus make the playing ﬁeld more level.
—The availability of IMF-funded rescue packages in financial crises
is not a decisive factor causing today’s crises. Back before World War I
there were no international rescue packages, yet there were crises.
Whether or not the availability of rescue packages has played a role in
aggravating crises is a much harder question: it is, after all, hard to prove
a negative. But there is certainly no evidence that even the worst of the
recent international ﬁnancial crises have been more virulent than the worst
crises of the past.
16
—Fixed exchange rate systems played an important role in speeding
recovery before World War I. Once the peak of the crisis had passed, all
actors expected a recovery to a ﬁxed parity, and this made for waves of sta-
bilizing, not destabilizing, speculation. The relevance of this point today is
not clear: it is difﬁcult in the current political context to create an exchange
rate that is not only ﬁxed but credibly ﬁxed. But a look back at history does
reinforce the hollowing out of intermediate positions on exchange rate
regimes that has been taking place over the past several years. In today’s
climate it may be that the beneﬁts of ﬁxed rate systems for handling ﬁnan-
cial crises can only be accomplished by dollarization (or perhaps euroiza-
tion, or yenization). 
The First Era of Globalization
Trade Flows Then and Now
It is increasingly commonplace to say that the world economy today has
become more integrated and more interconnected than ever before. Along
most dimensions, the present integration of national economies is judged
to surpass even that of the peak years of international integration just
before World War I.
17
258 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
16. Bordo and Schwartz (1996) make the best attempt thus far to compare the magnitude
of international financial crises across eras. Bordo and Eichengreen’s (1999) analysis of
their data suggests that international ﬁnancial crises now are less common than in the past,
and that the worst crises then were at least of the same magnitude as the worst crises now,
but that the average crisis then had smaller effects on the real economy than the average
crisis now.
17. Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin (1999); O’Rourke and Williamson (1999). 
08032—BI/BPEA DeLong  12/30/99 9:25 AM  Page 258As ﬁgure 1 shows, in recent years U.S. trade as a share of GNP has risen
above the levels reached during the pre–World War I years of the classi-
cal gold standard.18 Throughout much of that period, countries imposed
tariff barriers that, although low by the standards of previous eras, were
still high when measured as shares of the values of staple commodities.19
These barriers, together with high transport costs, kept the law of one price
from operating: in 1870 the prices of agricultural staples in Great Britain
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Figure 1. United States: Merchandise Trade, 1869–1997
Percent of GNP








Source: Bordo, Eichengreen, and Irwin (2000).
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ance of year-to-year price movements was not extraordinarily high.
20
Reinforcing the somewhat greater relative importance of international
trade today is the rise of the multinational enterprise. During the ﬁrst era of
globalization it was extremely difficult for company headquarters—
whether in London, New York, or Chicago—to specify production and to
control operations across the oceans. Today, by contrast, what is demanded
in New York on Tuesday can be known in the factories in Thailand on
Wednesday, and produced on Thursday. The implications of this increas-
ing reach of corporate control for how we should think about international
economic integration are not clear. But overseas investment by multi-
nationals today implies a much greater degree of control and integration of
production than did overseas investment by free-standing companies a
century ago. And this is not a change that should be ignored.
21
International Finance Then and Now
Although the world today is thus more globalized than ever before as
far as trade is concerned, it is still less globalized than it was before 1914
as far as the magnitude of net international capital flows is concerned.
Some analysts point out that international capital ﬂows before World War I
were confined to a relatively small group of industries and sectors. Capi-
tal flowed across national borders to lend to governments; to build ports,
sewers, and gas lines; to build railroads and mines. But by and large, until
the last years before World War I, it was nearly unheard of for capital to
ﬂow across national borders to make a portfolio investment in a manufac-
turing or service company headquartered in another country.
22
Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, and Jongwoo Kim interpret this
concentration of investment in “tangible and therefore relatively transpar-
ent assets” as showing how information asymmetries and perverse incen-
tives—crony capitalism—restricted capital flows and made the world
capital market before World War I less open than today.
23 This argument,
however, does not seem to take adequate account of the key role played
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today of air transport, rail transport, and road transport all rolled into one.
The number of sectors in which foreign investment was concentrated back
before World War I was indeed relatively small. The share of those sec-
tors in total turn-of-the-last-century investment was not. Foreign investors
poured funds into railroads not because of their lower informational risk,
but because that was where all the action was.
Moreover, focusing on international principal-agent and asymmetric
information problems today ignores the fact that domestic ﬁnancial market
imperfections appear to have been much larger a century ago, especially in
Britain. British dividend yields were markedly (between 2 and 4 percent-
age points) higher before World War I than they have been since, without
any clear fundamental reason: neither greater risk, nor higher interest rates,
nor sufficiently lower average rates of dividend growth. British investors
before World War I appear to have been fearful of equities. They preferred
to commit their savings to foreign ventures in infrastructure industries
like railroads and in loans to governments rather than risk their money in
what would likely have been less risky investments in domestic British
manufacturing.
24 And it is the relative magnitude of asymmetric informa-
tion and principal-agent problems between domestic and foreign invest-
ments that is relevant.
Flows of net international investment had built up, by the eve of World
War I, to net capital positions of astonishing magnitude. Great Britain in
1913 had net overseas assets of perhaps 47 percent of total domestic
wealth. An equivalent net overseas asset position for the United States
today, relative to GDP, would be about $14 trillion. At its peak, nearly
10 percent of British national product was earned by British capital
invested abroad.
25And Britain, although the largest holder of net overseas
assets relative to national product, was not an exceptional case. French and
Dutch citizens held between a quarter and a third of their wealth overseas
as well.
The large net international capital ﬂows of the pre–World War I period
meant that the association between domestic saving and investment rates
was weaker then than it is today. As ﬁgure 2 shows, in the generation after
World War II a 1-percentage-point rise in a country’s national saving rate
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rate; for the most recent generation the ﬁgure is slightly lower, at 0.7 per-
centage point. By contrast, in the generation before World War I, a 
1-percentage-point rise in the saving rate was associated with only a 
0.5-percentage-point increase in the investment rate, and in the genera-
tion after the Civil War the association was only 0.3 percentage point.26
The Feldstein-Horioka observation of a close correlation between national
saving and investment rates holds remarkably well today, but it was not a
characteristic of economies before World War I.
These enormous overseas asset positions were not built up smoothly,
as ﬁgure 3 shows. Net foreign investment by Britons, for example, reached
a high of nearly 8 percent of GDP in the early 1870s before falling to less
than 1 percent of GDP in 1877, and similar cycles are observed over the
succeeding forty years. Measured in percentage points of GDP, these cycli-
cal swings in net foreign investment had approximately twice as large a
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Figure 2. Coefﬁcients from Regressions of National Investment 
on National Saving Ratesa











a. Bars represent the effect on investment of a 1-percentage-point rise in the saving rate. The regression contains no additional
right-hand-side variables. 
08032—BI/BPEA DeLong  12/30/99 9:25 AM  Page 262magnitude as, and an inverse correlation with, pre–World War I cyclical
swings in British domestic investment.
27
It is worth pointing out that none of the fundamental explanations for
the large swings in overseas investment rates associated with recent ﬁnan-
cial crises apply to the large swings in British overseas investment before
1914. The receiving countries, which were overwhelmingly in what Arthur
Lewis called the temperate regions of European settlement—Argentina
(and Uruguay),Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States
28—
had stable governments: there were no swings from democracy to pop-
ulist dictatorship to internationalist oligarchy and back. The receiving
countries did not (with the exception of Argentina) adopt perverse infla-
tionary macroeconomic policies. There were no sudden recognitions by
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Figure 3. United Kingdom: Net Outward Foreign Investment, 1850–1913
Percent of GDP
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were no major supply shocks to derange the world pattern of production
and comparative advantage. Yet the share of its national product that
British investors thought it optimal to commit to overseas investments
repeatedly swung from 3 percent to 8 percent of GDP and back again.
How Severe Were Pre–World War I Financial Crises?
In the years after the U.S. Civil War, foreign capital ﬂowed abundantly
into the United States, financing perhaps half of the railroad boom of the
late 1860s and early 1870s. And in 1873 came the first crash. The spec-
tacular collapse of the Northern Pacific Railroad and the banking house
of Jay Cooke and Company, in the aftermath of scandals involving the
Union Paciﬁc’s Credit Mobilier, the Erie Railroad, and the attempt to cor-
ner the gold market, led to a rapid drying up of foreign investment in the
United States. It would be hard to argue that the corruption scandals and
the bankruptcies of 1873 took overseas investors by surprise. After all,
America had undergone a full-scale financial panic in 1857. And the first
American financial crisis had come some two decades earlier, when a
quarter of America’s states defaulted on signiﬁcant quantities of their debt.
After the crisis of the 1830s, British and other international lenders were
wary of lending to any level of the U.S. government for a decade or so.
As a look back at ﬁgure 3 will conﬁrm, the crash of 1873 affected British
overseas investment not just in the United States but elsewhere as well.
Economies far removed from Erie magnate Jay Gould’s assault on the gold
market, or from the river of bribes that the promoters of the Union Paciﬁc
Railroad paid to congressmen to get their votes for subsidies for trans-
continental railroad construction, felt the stringency as well.
Quantitative estimates of the amplitude of the U.S. business cycle back
in the 1870s are of very poor reliability. But the panic of 1873 had a clear
impact on financial markets. The call money rate in the key month of the
crisis, September 1873, averaged more than 61 percent: anyone with
money to lend that month and the courage to lend it, and who succeeded in
choosing a borrower that repaid, made 5 percent over that month alone.
But the effect on the real productive economy is less clear. One quantita-
tive measure of the effects of this ﬁnancial crisis comes from looking at the
time pattern of railroad construction. As ﬁgure 4 shows, in 1870 and 1871
U.S. railroad construction reached its post–Civil War peak. The number
264 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
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was growing at about 12 percent a year. The construction of 6,000 new
miles of railroad every year employed perhaps one-tenth of America’s
nonfarm paid labor force and absorbed half of the potential production of
America’s metal industries.
Four years later, in the wake of the crisis, railroad construction had
collapsed. In 1875, operated railroad mileage grew by only 3 percent. Rail-
road construction then employed less than 3 percent of America’s nonfarm
paid labor force and required perhaps 15 percent of the potential produc-
tion of America’s metal industries. We know what happened next to the
metal industries: they shut down, the less efficient ones permanently. We
do not know what happened to the workers. It is suspected that they largely
returned to farms owned by their relatives until the nonfarm economy
expanded again. 
However, a decade later domestic and foreign investors were back.
British overseas investment grew to a new cyclical peak of 7 percent of
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Figure 4. United States: Growth in Railroad Construction, 1850–90
Percent change in operated track miles from previous year





Source:Author’s calculations from Historical Statistics of the United States.
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proportional share. Once again the U.S. economy underwent a great rail-
road construction boom, with the number of miles of track in service grow-
ing at 10 percent a year. O. M. W. Sprague, reviewing the monetary and
ﬁnancial history of the United States for Congress after the panic of 1907,
found ﬁnancial crises worth writing about (each with a foreign origin or a
substantial international component) in 1890, 1893, and 1907 as well as
in 1873 and 1884.
29This works out to one major ﬁnancial crisis every eight
years for the pre–World War I United States—a pace that no single coun-
try in the current generation has matched. 
The U.S. experience was not atypical. Latin America suffered through
similar financial crises, driven by similar patterns of optimism and
retrenchment. Carlos Marichal narrates three major international lending
cycles in Latin America before 1914: the ﬁrst ending with a crash in 1825,
the second ending with the 1873 crisis in North America triggered by the
collapse of Jay Cooke and the Northern Pacific, and the third ending in
1890 with the spectacular ﬁrst bankruptcy of Barings and the default of the
Argentine government. But in Latin America as well, capital flows
resumed—within less than a decade after the crises of 1873 and 1890.
30
The causes of these financial crises are not straightforward. The 1873
crisis is traditionally blamed on revelations of corruption in American pol-
itics and on Jay Cooke’s decision to go double-or-nothing when the North-
ern Pacific Railroad fell behind schedule. But why should revelations of
corruption in North American politics—corruption that struck observers
there as more or less business-as-usual—have led British investors to
shun Latin America as well? 
The 1884 crisis appears to have had its origin in Britain. The crisis of
1890 appears to have originated in Argentina (with the caveat that Barings
had seen what might be coming in 1888, and it, too, had made a double-
or-nothing wager). The 1893 crisis appears to have resulted from fears in
Britain that populist political pressures would force America off the gold
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gency in Britain and the extreme vulnerability generated by America’s
inelastic currency and four previous years of rapid macroeconomic expan-
sion.
31 Whatever its origin, the 1907 crisis was deep: U.S. pig iron pro-
duction fell by 60 percent between October 1907 and January 1908. It
was also widespread, affecting Italy and Australia as well as the United
States, despite a lack of any clear fundamental transmission mechanism.
The Lessons of History
Lessons About Financial Market Reform
The ﬁrst issue of the current debate on which this century-old ﬁnancial
history can be brought to bear is that of the need for structural financial
market reform in emerging markets hit by crisis. Those who give a high
priority to institutional reform maintain that the recent financial crises
arose from the belated recognition of investors in the industrial core of
the degree of corruption—crony capitalism—at the periphery. To the
extent that this view is correct, and to the extent that this recognition leads
to a one-shot permanent change in assessments of the value of investments
in emerging markets, it follows that recovery and a return of capital
inﬂows are unlikely without substantial institutional reform that will make
ﬁnance a more level playing ﬁeld. 
Yet the hangers-on of Suharto have added nothing to what the
financiers, investors, and entrepreneurs who guided America’s economic
development during the Gilded Age, and the politicians holding office dur-
ing the Grant, Hayes, and Cleveland administrations, already knew about
crony capitalism. Financial market reform came late to the United States:
even on the eve of the election of Woodrow Wilson, Thomas Lamont, a
partner of J. P. Morgan, could seriously argue to progressive attorney
Louis Brandeis that it was better and fairer for everybody if the Morgan
partnership represented all sides in a single corporate control transaction.
32
Yet foreign investment returned to the United States time after time during
this era.
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transcontinental railroad, which ran from San Francisco to Ogden, Utah,
where it linked with the Union Pacific in 1869. The federal government
contributed $24 million in cash (and 9 million acres of land) to the Cen-
tral Pacific. The cities of northern California pitched in as well, after one
of the railroad’s promoters, ex-governor of California Leland Stanford,
hinted that cities that did not fund the railroad might ﬁnd that the railroad
bypassed them. Bonds were sold in New York and London as Central
Pacific founders Stanford, Colis Huntington, Charles Crocker, and Mark
Hopkins advertised the proﬁts that could be reaped from what would be for
a decade or more the only rail connection to California.
33
What Stanford, Huntington, Crocker, and Hopkins did not advertise was
that they, as officers of the Central Pacific, had subcontracted construc-
tion work for the railroad to the Central Pacific Credit and Finance Cor-
poration, which they owned. The shareholders of the Central Pacific
wound up with a heavily indebted railroad, and the owners of the Central
Pacific Credit and Finance Corporation wound up with fortunes. A sub-
stantial part of Leland Stanford’s share would later serve as the core
endowment for one of the best universities in California.
34
It is not clear which other politicians shared in the proﬁts of the Central
Pacific. The record of the Credit Mobilier investigation into the Union
Pacific suggests that a substantial amount of money flowed back to those
members of Congress who had voted for railroad subsidies. Matthew
Josephson claims that Colis Huntington went so far as to write that bribing
politicians was his moral duty: “If you have to pay money [to a politician]
to have the right thing done, it is only just and fair to do it. . . . If a [politician]
has the power to do great evil and won’t do right unless he is bribed to do
it, I think . . . it is a man’s duty to go up and bribe [that politician]. . . . ”
35
The best of America’s robber barons was probably E. H. Harriman, a
careful executive with a talent for picking engineers to improve the oper-
ations of the Union Pacific Railroad and a willingness to invest in infra-
structure now to make profits later. His friends said that Harriman was
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disagreed. Harriman also controlled the Illinois Central Railroad. Once,
while chairing an annual meeting, Harriman made the unexpected ruling
that the provision of the Illinois Central’s bylaws that allowed for proxy
votes was invalid because it was in conflict with the laws of the state of
Illinois. The Morgan family’s clients were primarily in London, did not
want to attend meetings in America, and had given J. P. Morgan their prox-
ies. The Morgan candidates for the board of directors were not elected.
36
Leland Stanford’s way of doing business surely had substantial costs.
The risk that an investor in London would ﬁnd out ex post that his money
was in the hands of a ruthless robber baron was not a “fundamental”
source of risk that should have been taken into account in calculating the
optimal capital ﬂow from nation to nation.
Some saw a market opportunity in the resulting conﬂict of emotions in
the hearts of London investors: of fear that their agents would prove dis-
honest, and of greed for the high returns they might reap from financing
the industrialization of the global periphery. As the Gilded Age began, J. S.
Morgan sailed from New York to London, leaving his son J. P. Morgan
behind in America to keep track of what was going on in Philadelphia,
New York, and Hartford. The elder Morgan held himself out to British
investors as an honest broker who had excellent lines of communication
with the United States. He promised to steer British investors away from
those railroads in the grasp of the true robber barons and toward those
managed by sober, honest executives and engineers, in return for a mod-
est ﬁnder’s fee.
This broad strategy was successful. The reputation, contacts, and wealth
accumulated thereby were the keys to J. P. Morgan’s turn-of-the-century
dominance over American railroad reorganizations and industrial ﬁnance.
And later on, clients who believed that the Morgans pére and fils had
guided them well in railroad ﬁnance in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s were
willing to accept, in the 1900s, the Morgan partnership’s declarations that
the manufacturing and industrial enterprises it financed were worthwhile
investments as well.
37The magnitude of the fortunes amassed by J. P. Mor-
gan and his partners is an index of the size of the resource misallocations
caused by crony capitalism, American style. They suggest that the Har-
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crony capitalism are likely to have been large as well.
But on the narrower issue—is ﬁnancial market reform needed for recov-
ery and for a resumption of large-scale capital inflows?—the answer is a
clear no. Waves of foreign capital returned to nineteenth-century America
after each panic and crash. And they returned not just to invest in ﬁrms that
had the stamp of approval of sober investment banks concerned with their
own long-term reputation, but to invest in other, more speculative, risky,
and robber baron–ridden enterprises as well. From one perspective, this
makes institutional reform in crisis-afflicted countries today less press-
ing, by showing that it is not necessary for recovery. Moreover, economists
who make strong recommendations about optimal systems for organizing
corporate control risk exceeding their knowledge. True, the American
system does provide a relatively level playing ﬁeld for providers and users
of capital. Yet it also suffers from the problem identified by Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means: who will monitor a firm’s managers when share-
holders have every incentive to free-ride on others’ monitoring of those
managers?
38 As already noted, the financial systems of East Asia—infor-
mation asymmetries, tilted playing fields, and all—have supported the
fastest growth over an entire generation that the world economy has seen
anytime, anywhere. A decade ago their systems of financial organization
were seen not as examples of destructive “crony capitalism” but as adap-
tations of a Germano-Japanese system of large-scale bank-led finance
that was efﬁcient for late industrializers, at least until they caught up to the
world’s industrial leaders.
39
From another perspective, however, the likely return of capital inflows
makes institutional reform more important. The information asymmetries
that caused so much trouble in East Asia in 1997–98 will again cause trou-
ble when the next wave of international investment reaches its peak. If
ﬁnancial market reform is not necessary to attract foreign capital, govern-
ments presiding over newly industrializing economies will have little
incentive to undertake it on their own. And in the long run we all may have
a lot to lose from the absence of a level ﬁnancial playing ﬁeld.
270 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1999
38. Berle and Means (1932); Calomiris and Ramirez (1996).
39. Gerschenkron (1962). Both Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Frankel have, in conver-
sation with the author, stressed the possibility that the Germano-Japanese system of finan-
cial organization has advantages at early stages and the Anglo-American system at later
stages of development.
08032—BI/BPEA DeLong  12/30/99 9:25 AM  Page 270Lessons About Rescue Packages
The second live issue is the role of the IMF and the rescue packages it
provides. Do these packages ease crises and provide a much-needed time-
out, during which necessary adjustments can take place? Are they ways
to ride out irrational panics on the part of investors in the industrial core?
Or are they the source of the moral hazard, the very factor keeping the
market from handling crises on its own, easily, efﬁciently, and painlessly? 
The answer to the simple form of this question—are IMF-sponsored
rescue packages the cause of the current wave of financial crises?—is a
clear no. Before World War I there was no IMF, yet there were interna-
tional ﬁnancial crises.
Although there was no IMF during the Gilded Age, there were occa-
sional episodes of cross-national financial support. From time to time the
Bank of England would lend to the Bank of France, when money ﬂowing
out of France reduced France’s reserves, in the (correct) expectation that
the gold ﬂow would soon reverse itself and that the Bank of France would
pay back the loan. The Bank of England also used borrowing as a stan-
dard strategy for dealing with an external drain from its own coffers. 
But this pooling of reserve resources was open to hard-money western
European central banks only.
40 Outside the circle of the Bank of England,
the Bank of France, and the Bank of Germany, large-scale support for an
economy facing a balance of payments crisis was simply not available.
Other countries facing crises had to meet them with their own resources,
with no public bridge loans to buy time during which policy changes could
take effect, and no support to outlast the pessimistic animal spirits of
investors in the industrial core.
By contrast, such rescue packages are a prominent feature of the inter-
national ﬁnancial landscape today. Approximately $25 billion in additional
funds was lent to the Mexican government in early 1995, albeit for shorter
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has been and is being provided to Brazil. And the funds committed to
East Asia in the past two years have been an order of magnitude larger than
those provided to Mexico.
A more sophisticated formulation of the moral hazard hypothesis—
and a common complaint—has been that these international rescue oper-
ations have been a major contributor to the severity of recent crises, if not
their sole cause. Why hesitate to lend to a banking system in trouble if
one is confident that the IMF will bail out the government, the govern-
ment will bail out the banking system, and the banking system will repay
you, the lender, if things turn out badly? The answer to this criticism is
much less clear. Again, it is difficult to prove a negative. The theoretical
effect is there. So the presumption must be that there is an effect. But
given all of the other factors involved, it is hard to see how it could be a
large effect.
The standard counterargument to this criticism is that the IMF does usu-
ally get repaid, both principal and interest, and that the public humiliation
of having to borrow from the IMF is a further deterrent. Moral hazard
requires a net injection of funds. As long as there is no net injection of
funds, there can be no moral hazard.
Yet this argument is not fully convincing. The domestic banks and those
who lent to them do get rescued. It is domestic taxpayers in the country
being rescued—who had little influence on the financial decisions that
went awry—who end up repaying the IMF. Rescue packages that are
repaid may not create moral hazard because they are not a net injection of
funds. But rescue packages do give governments the hard currency that
governments then need to create moral hazard. In the jargon of modern pop
psychology, even if the IMF gets repaid in full and is not a creator of moral
hazard, it is nevertheless likely to be an enabler of moral hazard. The argu-
ment that the IMF’s operating procedures prevent the problem from even
arising is not sufﬁcient.
But the theoretical presumption that the existence of rescue packages
has encouraged investors in emerging markets to ignore the risks of ﬁnan-
cial crisis is not, by itself, enough to settle even the theoretical issue. Any
social planner attempting to calculate the desired ﬂow of capital to emerg-
ing markets would look at the expected proﬁts from investment—the mar-
ginal product of the capital—and discount appropriately for the risk that
the investment might turn out to be unproductive. Such a social planner
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might have an irrational change of sentiment and seek to pull their invest-
ments out. Such a source of risk is not “fundamental”; it has no place in
any social welfare calculation. 
To the extent that financial crises are caused by such shifts in animal
spirits on the part of investors in the industrial core, it is socially efﬁcient
for public action to offset this source of risk. It is only “fundamental” and
not “noise” risk that should be priced.
41 Moreover, it is likely that inter-
national efforts to encourage the quick resolution of banking crises and to
provide resources for recapitalization have contributed to earlier recovery
from banking crises.
42 These beneﬁts must be set off against any potential
costs from any additional moral hazard.
What does history say about international rescue packages? The late
nineteenth century shows clearly that an absence of such packages is not
a sufficient condition for eliminating international financial crises. Thus
extreme claims—no rescue packages, no financial crises like those seen
in Mexico or in East Asia—are unsupported. Large-scale international
capital flows appear to generate major international financial crises on
their own, without the IMF’s help.
Those who believe that the availability of rescue programs has
increased the severity of international financial crises can point to calcu-
lations by Bordo, Eichengreen, and Douglas Irwin using data from the
Bordo and Schwartz database. These calculations show that financial
crises before 1914 were somewhat less severe on average than recent ones
have been. There appears to be an average 3-percentage-point decline in
GDP growth relative to trend during the crisis year in crises since 1972,
compared with an average 2-percentage-point decline relative to trend in
the crisis year in crises before 1914.
43
Those who believe otherwise can point, as Bordo and Eichengreen do,
to the fact that including the financial crises associated with the outbreak
of World War I in the pre-Depression sample makes the average pre-
J. Bradford DeLong 273
41. See DeLong and others (1989).
42. Stanley Fischer has observed, in conversation, that the contrast between the Mexican
financial crises of 1982 and 1995 seems instructive. Growth resumed just one year after
the peak of the second crisis, but not until five years after the peak of the first crisis. Mex-
ico received no large-scale IMF or other public support in the ﬁrst crisis. But in the second
crisis Mexico got substantial support from the IMF and from the United States. 
43. Bordo, Eichengreen, and Kim (1998).
08032—BI/BPEA DeLong  12/30/99 9:25 AM  Page 273Depression financial crisis more severe. One can also note that the most
severe crises of the pre-1914 period—Argentina in 1890 and the United
States in 1893—had more severe real consequences than any of the recent
series of crises. Bordo and Eichengreen calculate that Argentine economic
growth in the crisis year was 17 percentage points below trend and that
U.S. growth was 9 percentage points below its ﬁve-year trend; these mag-
nitudes far exceed Korea’s 7-percentage-point decline in GDP growth
relative to trend during the recent episode. The difference is especially
striking when one considers that East Asian trend growth rates of GDP
per capita in the precrisis 1990s were three times those in the United States
or Argentina in the precrisis 1880s.
44
The fact that it is hard to find clear differences in the magnitude of the
real effects between the recent international financial crises and those
before 1914 is both heartening and disheartening to supporters of inter-
national financial rescues. What is heartening is that history gives no
strong reason to think that the Mexican or the Asian crisis was outside the
bounds of what the “normal” workings of a market economy with large
international capital ﬂows might generate. If the Mexican and Asian crises
had no counterparts as large or larger in relative terms back before World
War I, it would be good reason to think that the current international mon-
etary system—of which IMF-led rescue packages are a significant part—
is a less effective social mechanism for handling crises than the pre-1914
classical gold standard was. On the other hand, what is disheartening is
that this historical comparison supplies no evidence that the current inter-
national monetary system is superior to the classical gold standard at han-
dling international ﬁnancial crises. 
Lessons About Exchange Rate Regimes
The third important issue is the appropriate exchange rate policy to
avoid or handle a crisis. Is it better to regard the exchange rate as a price
that one can freely move about to switch and guide expenditures? Or is it
better to regard it as a promise: to incur substantial costs in order to keep
the exchange rate pegged, and hope that keeping promises made in the past
will create the expectation that promises will be kept in the future?
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ing the first era of globalization and those that prevail today is the differ-
ence between their monetary regimes. The half-century before World War I
was the era of the classical gold standard. Country after country joined
Britain in pegging its currency to gold. The expectation was that curren-
cies, or at least the currencies of well-run countries, would have stable
exchange rates into the indefinite future. This became a natural back-
ground assumption that governed the expectations of nearly all inter-
national investors.
By contrast, today’s international monetary system is one of nearly
clean floating among the four major world currencies—the dollar, the
euro, the yen, and the pound—and a variety of dirty ﬂoats, pegs, and semi-
pegs on the part of most other countries. The live question today as far as
the choice of exchange rate policy is concerned is whether to ﬂoat, to peg,
or to dollarize (or perhaps, in the near future, to yenize or euroize). In
recent years the middle range of exchange rate policy options has hollowed
out. Many former advocates of weak pegs or dirty ﬂoating now think that
such systems combine the disadvantages of a float and of dollarization.
And so the extremes have gained ground.
Before World War I, adherence to the gold standard meant that the pol-
icy goal of the government was to maintain the gold parity of the cur-
rency and to restore the currency to that parity should it fall below par as
a result of a crisis. Thus commitment to the gold standard ensured that,
once the resolution of the crisis was in sight, capital inﬂows would become
stabilizing rather than destabilizing. Depreciation would be viewed not as
a sign of the likely collapse of the value of the currency, but as an oppor-
tunity to make capital gains by buying up the currency.
45
During the U.S. suspension of payments in 1907, for example, cash dol-
lars (and gold and foreign exchange) went to a premium of 2 percentage
points over dollar bank deposits (and other internal domestic means of
liquidity). Such a depreciation in the value of the banking-system dollar
seems very small in our eyes: we are used to seeing financial crises bring
depreciations of 20 or even 50 percent. But because the commitment to the
gold standard was believed, this small (and illegal) emergency deprecia-
tion was sufficient to bring the flow of money out of the U.S. banking
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be over and the U.S. banking-system dollar would return to its normal par-
ity was enough to balance fears of financial institution bankruptcy and
the need for extra liquidity.
46
Thus, for Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, and for the United
States after the effective end of the Populist movement, the fact that the
exchange rate under the classical gold standard was viewed as a firm
promise was a great help in resolving financial crises. For other coun-
tries, and for the United States in the early 1890s (when the Populist move-
ment cast doubt on its long-run commitment to the gold standard), the
fact that the government’s commitment to the gold standard was not seen
as an unbreakable promise was a potential source of disorder. 
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, for example, concluded in their
Monetary History of the United States that in the early 1890s the United
States had the worst of both worlds. The fact that the political establish-
ment saw the gold standard as the only appropriate economic policy meant
that the United States stuck to the gold standard. But the fact that foreign-
ers saw the Populist movement as likely to gain power and force a depre-
ciation meant that sticking to the gold standard required very high real
interest rates, which depressed investment and production throughout the
first half of the 1890s.
47 As figure 5 shows, except for the Great Depres-
sion, the depression of the 1890s was by far the worst, as measured by
the level of unemployment, that the United States has experienced since
1890, the earliest date for which aggregate annual estimates are available.
48
The lesson from history seems to be that a strong, credible, and credited
commitment to a fixed exchange rate parity does indeed have substantial
beneﬁts. The problem is, How does a country create the necessary belief in
its commitment? The European crisis of 1992 showed that not even Britain
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of foreign exchange traders. 
Eichengreen has argued that the disastrous interwar experience demon-
strates that the kind of commitment to a ﬁxed parity needed for the classi-
cal gold standard to function well is not possible for a stand-alone currency
in the modern age. In this age of mass politics it is generally recognized
that government policies can have powerful short-run effects on produc-
tion and employment, and suffrage is extended well beyond those who
have a financial interest in hard money. These two factors make it non-
credible for any government to claim that it is committed to a ﬁxed parity
regardless of the macroeconomic consequences. And when the govern-
ment’s commitment is not believed, a fixed parity does not seem to work
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their parities, and the more strongly they tried to commit themselves to the
gold standard, the worse their economies performed.
49
These conclusions are pessimistic ones. But it is difficult to find an
alternative explanation for the failure of orthodox “classical” policies to
bring recovery during the Great Depression, given their apparent success
at producing rapid recovery in the years before World War I.
50 Something
must have changed about the environment in which economic policy was
made.
Conclusion
The freedom of movement of capital has grown since the 1960s and has
brought substantial benefits. It is difficult to see, for example, how the
United States could have managed the decade of the Reagan budget
deficits without strong and visible damage to capital accumulation and
economic growth had it lacked the ability to borrow abroad on a large
scale. The promise that growth-promoting macroeconomic policies will
attract capital from abroad gives developing-country governments an addi-
tional incentive to take the long, growth-oriented view. The opportunity for
a newly industrializing economy to borrow from the industrial core to
finance its development is perhaps the consequence of international capi-
tal mobility that offers the greatest social benefit, if it can be attained. It
would mean that such countries can cut perhaps a decade off the time
they need to achieve industrial-country standards of living. But the free
ﬂow of ﬁnancial capital is also giving us a major international ﬁnancial cri-
sis every four years. And there is no reason to think that the East Asian cri-
sis of 1997–98 will be the last.
The great macroeconomists of the Depression era—John Maynard
Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and their peers—would say that we now
need to heed the lesson that they themselves learned in the Great Depres-
sion. Capital controls and other devices are needed to keep international
flows of investment small, manageable, and firmly corralled. Financial
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herd behavior for large-scale international capital ﬂows to be tolerated. 
Over the past decade, however, we economists have bemoaned the fact
that capital controls keep people in industrial countries with money to lend
away from people in developing countries who could make good use of
that money. We have argued that capital controls are difﬁcult to maintain.
We have noted that capital controls appear to have been a source of bad
government and corruption on a large scale. The balance of opinion over
the past decade has been that stringent capital controls sacriﬁce too much
in the way of economic growth—but this balance may be shifting.
A look back at history shows no easy way of controlling the macro-
economic instability that large-scale capital flows create. History does
leave clues that a strong, credible, and credited commitment to unalterable
exchange rate parities would do some good, but we do not know how to
create such a commitment in the age of mass politics by any means short
of dollarization. And dollarization appears much more appealing today,
after two decades in which U.S. macroeconomic policymakers have been
both skillful and lucky, than it would have appeared two decades ago or
may appear two decades hence. There is a sense in which the differences
between the Bretton Woods system in its heyday and mass dollarization
are subtle ones.
History does not suggest that we could eliminate crises if only we elim-
inated the rescue packages that have been devised to manage crises. It does
not suggest that the creation of international agencies to fund rescue pack-
ages has created the problems with which the IMF now deals. On the other
hand, neither does history suggest that the international economy today is
more stable than it was in the last great era of globalization. Economists
who believe that IMF-sponsored support packages have done much good
now have the task of pointing to other factors that have changed and made
the world economy more unstable, that is, more prone to financial crisis,
than it was back before 1914.
Finally, history does not suggest that the fight for a more level playing
field between borrowers and lenders—as worthy a goal as that is—will
have much effect one way or the other on the incidence of crises like those
we have seen in the 1990s. A more level ﬁnancial playing ﬁeld is likely to
make the benefits from international capital flows greater. But there is no
reason to see it as a necessary prerequisite for recovery, or as a panacea
that will protect against future crises.
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Comments and 
Discussion
Richard N. Cooper: Henry Ford is reputed to have said that “history is
bunk.” I presume he meant at least that one cannot learn from history any-
thing useful for guidance in the present or the future, and perhaps even that
history is positively misleading with respect to the present and the future.
Bradford DeLong’s paper is a concrete counterexample to the Ford
proposition.
One of the important uses of history is to debunk currently fashionable
social scientiﬁc generalizations, such as, in the case at hand, theories about
what will and will not produce financial crises, and what are the conse-
quences of those crises. In short, historical material can help us to sort
among competing durable hypotheses about human behavior.
DeLong nicely uses the late nineteenth-century period of globaliza-
tion, to use the current buzzword, to cast serious doubt on three currently
fashionable generalizations coming out of the financial crises of the past
four years. The first is that crony capitalism has to be severely curtailed
before capital flows will resume to countries where crony capitalism is
endemic. U.S. history suggests, as DeLong colorfully points out, that that
claim is simply false. Why it is false—whether because new, inexperi-
enced investors replace the ones who have been burned, or because mem-
ories are short, or because crony capitalism actually facilitates foreign
investment—is a subject for serious inquiry, but the proposition that capi-
tal will not return relatively quickly does not stand historical scrutiny.
The second, which has been invoked by people of high political prestige
and authority, is that recent financial crises have been caused by the
prospect that the International Monetary Fund will “bail out” countries and
hence foreign creditors that run into difﬁculty. Without this prospect, it has
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that lending would have been solidly based.
DeLong shows that, even in an era in which there existed neither an
IMF nor any functional substitute for it, a large amount of foreign invest-
ment took place (relative to the other economic magnitudes of the time).
He also shows that, sure enough, financial crises occurred, placing the for-
eign lenders at risk. Although one cannot infer from this information that
the presence of the IMF played no role in recent international lending,
one can state that a quasi lender of last resort is not a necessary condition
for much foreign lending that, ex post, turns out to have been ill advised.
The third generalization is that fixed exchange rates ensure financial
crises and that ﬂoating the exchange rate is a way to avoid such crises in the
future. As DeLong points out, late-nineteenth-century history offers less
guidance on this question, because the expectational environment was com-
pletely different under the gold standard in the 1890s than it is under fiat
money in the 1990s. Nonetheless, simple generalizations about fixed or
floating exchange rates are unlikely to be universally correct, and even here
history suggests a degree of caution about contemporary generalizations.
Let me say a word about the recent crises. In my view, the IMF played
essentially no role in creating moral hazard in all but one of the financial
crises during the past four years. The exception is Russia, where the
prospect of an international bailout probably did lead foreign investors to
buy more Russian government securities than they would have otherwise.
But here it should be said that the IMF was simply the point man for Ger-
many and the United States, with support from other G-7 countries. These
industrial powers did not want to see a collapse of Russian economic
reforms, of Russian democracy, or of effective central control over Rus-
sia’s strategic nuclear weapons. 
Moral hazard was abundant in these several crises, but it was over-
whelmingly associated with crony capitalism, where many local borrow-
ers could and did assume that their government would bail them out if they
got into ﬁnancial difﬁculty. That view would have prevailed with or with-
out the IMF.
DeLong emphasizes the importance, in long-term and long-distance
lending, of information asymmetries, and of the role in U.S. history of J. P.
Morgan, who established himself as an honest broker between lenders
and borrowers, thus effectively reducing those asymmetries. I accept the
importance of such asymmetries in many circumstances, but I doubt they
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any information asymmetries in Europe’s financial crises of 1992. The
situation was quite transparent. All relevant players could see the range
of possible outcomes, they made different guesses on what would hap-
pen, and some of them thereby forced events.
I would instead emphasize the intrinsic fragility of all ﬁnancial markets.
That fragility arises from the simple fact that most lenders want to get their
money back whenever they need it, whereas most borrowers want to keep
the money for as long as they need it. The trick of all modern and well-
functioning financial markets is to appear to satisfy these conflicting
desires of both lenders and borrowers. Loans appear liquid to the lenders,
durable to the borrowers. Maturity transformation is a critical element in
financial intermediation. But it involves an illusion. To work, it relies on
the law of large numbers, or more accurately, on the broad independence
of the liquidity needs of different lenders, so that the intermediaries can
satisfy both the ultimate lenders and the ultimate borrowers.
But from time to time the law of large numbers breaks down, sometimes
dramatically, and many lenders want their money at the same time. This
can happen either because they make that decision independently of each
other—a low-probability random event—or more often because some new
information (or possibly misinformation) triggers a common reaction. 
Recently a well-regarded life insurance company, General American,
narrowly avoided financial collapse. It was engaged in relatively modest
maturity transformation, but it either forgot or chose to ignore the fact
that its short-term borrowing, nominally with maturities of 90 or 180 days,
had 7-day call provisions. The bond rating agency Moody’s downgraded
General American’s debt from AA2 to AA3 and directly informed the
lenders of the rating change. Many lenders then invoked the 7-day provi-
sion, and General American nearly went under. It managed to ﬁnd a buyer,
so the policyholders were protected. But its maturity transformation was
dramatically undone by a triggering event, in this case by an entirely unac-
countable private party, the rating agency.
Maturity transformation with its attendant risks is a general character-
istic of all modern financial markets. We have created a complex institu-
tional structure to minimize the real and financial damage that can be
caused by ﬁnancial market failure. We have rules and regulations to inhibit
important ﬁnancial institutions from taking undue risks and to ensure that
they have enough capital to cover normal risks. We create lenders of last
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may offend free marketeers, but in my view some such structure is neces-
sary for well-functioning markets, and without it some financial markets
would not exist.
Countries such as Thailand and Korea, where the real economy regis-
tered outstanding performance for several decades, failed to evolve the
ﬁnancial superstructure in tandem, and the ﬁnancial crises of 1997 reﬂected
the mismatch between the requirements of their real economies and the
evolution of their ﬁnancial systems. As DeLong’s paper reminds us,Amer-
icans have no grounds for being smug on this score: the United States expe-
rienced ﬁnancial crises on average every eight years during a corresponding
period of its development. And it took the catastrophe of the Great Depres-
sion to get us to put in place the complex regulatory system that has served
the U.S. economy well during the past sixty years—although even that did
not protect us from the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.
I have a few quibbles with DeLong’s paper. First, he suggests, in dis-
cussing the European financial crises of 1992, that it was only the belief
that macroeconomic policies would prove unsustainable that made them
unsustainable and inappropriate. That was certainly not the case for Italy,
whose exchange rate against the deutsche mark had been unchanged for
over five years despite considerably higher inflation rates in Italy than in
Germany. It was arguably also not the case for Great Britain and Sweden.
Britain had gone into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1990
with what was widely believed at the time to be an overvalued pound ster-
ling. Sweden faced a banking crisis arising from excessive lending in the
1980s, which at least suggested that the traditional Swedish strategy of
cushioning imported recessions with stimulative monetary and fiscal pol-
icy was no longer feasible.
Second, DeLong suggests that the East Asian countries were pursuing
appropriate macroeconomic policies. It is true that by comparison with
most Latin American countries in the 1980s their policies were exemplary.
But Thailand’s difﬁculty arose largely from inappropriate macroeconomic
policy in the circumstances of late 1996 and early 1997. As in Mexico in
1994, the central bank continued to finance from reserves a large current
account deﬁcit that was no longer covered by sufﬁcient net capital inﬂows,
and it sterilized this intervention. (It also neglected to report publicly the
rapid decline in usable foreign exchange reserves, in a clear case of asym-
metric information.)
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fessional opinion is that stringent capital controls sacrifice too much in the
way of economic growth (and have other compelling disadvantages) to
be useful. The operative word here, in my view, is “stringent” rather than
“capital controls.” There is a wide gradation of possible restrictions on
international capital movements. As I argued in the last issue of the Brook-
ings Papers,
1 at least some forms of restriction on capital movements in
some circumstances are likely to be growth enhancing rather than growth
reducing.
Benjamin M. Friedman: One would have to have been living in a closet
not to be aware that the events of the 1990s in world ﬁnancial markets have
called sharply into question key elements of what used to be standard
dogma among many economists and market participants. Is there anyone
left who still believes that currency fluctuations mostly reflect the chang-
ing outlook for differences in countries’ rates of price inflation? Or that
currency market speculation is mostly if not always stabilizing? As Jason
Furman and Joseph Stiglitz showed in an article in the Brookings Papers
last year,
1 comparing the experiences of different Asian and Latin Ameri-
can countries in the rolling crisis of 1997–98 even provides evidence
against the comforting view that countries with higher indebtedness are
more likely to get into financial trouble. The evidence they assembled
also contradicts the view that international investors place value on, and
hence reward, ﬁnancial “transparency.” Finally, does anybody not directly
employed by a bond fund still believe that the forces that William Gross
at Pacific Investment Management calls the “bond market vigilantes,”
and that Thomas Friedman of the New York Times calls “the electronic
herd,” do a good job of policing countries’macroeconomic policies? Alas,
the bond market vigilantes turn out to be simply investors who have some-
how discovered the ultimate truth that bad news is bad because it’s bad and
good news is worse because it’s inﬂationary.
The demolition of so many propositions that only recently commanded
widespread support (at least in some quarters) has created a new debate.
The chief issue is what either individual countries or the world financial
community acting in concert should do to reduce the likelihood of future
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Bradford DeLong undertakes in this paper is to see what lessons we can
draw to inform that debate from economic history, especially U.S. history
from the era when the United States relied heavily on borrowing from
abroad to ﬁnance the nation’s early industrialization. As one would expect
from his earlier work, DeLong tells this story with verve and ﬂair, impart-
ing along the way something of the color and even the drama of an earlier
America whose shortcomings we now willingly submerge in the romance
of nostalgia. He even reminds us that, in America, universities are the
ultimate money launderers. (As the sons of the Puritans who for centuries
managed my own institution always seemed to maintain, no matter how
sordidly you earned it, once you have given it to Harvard and Harvard
has spent it, in the eyes of God and man it is cleansed.)
What, then, can this history teach us about the important questions that
perplex both public policymakers and private market participants in the
wake of the events of the 1990s? DeLong draws three conclusions from the
history he reviews. The most signiﬁcant of these is that fairly soon after a
financial crisis has cleared up—even if the failure of borrowing coun-
tries’institutional arrangements and the malfeasance of speciﬁc borrowers
have been a large part of the story—capital once again begins to flow to
those same countries and often to those very borrowers. Hence reforms
of the kind demanded by the International Monetary Fund from key Asian
countries in the most recent crisis have historically not been a necessary
condition for the resumption of lending.
This conclusion is interesting not only because it speaks to a question of
genuine practical importance in many borrowing countries today (for
example, in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand) but also because it squarely
contradicts familiar views on this subject. Even if the bond market vigi-
lantes did know how to distinguish good economic policies from bad,
they would not insist on good ones anyway—or if they did, they would not
be able to make their insistence stick. Similarly, it is wrong, historically, to
think of the electronic herd of institutional lenders as powerfully imposing
its will on important borrowers. On DeLong’s evidence, it might be just
as plausible to see these lenders as mere cattle, whom the borrowers, sit-
ting tall in the saddle, herd from one country to another to be milked and
slaughtered. 
DeLong’s second conclusion from the historical evidence is straight-
forward. Frequent breakdowns in lending markets, not unlike what we
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was neither an IMF nor any other visible international safety net. Hence
it is wrong to point to moral hazard created by the IMF, or by parallel
arrangements, as a necessary condition for the markets to experience such
problems. Correspondingly, it is wrong to think of reforming the IMF, or
even of abolishing the institution as some have recently suggested, as suf-
ﬁcient to prevent such crises from recurring. 
This finding is no doubt true, but weak (as DeLong also makes clear).
The relevant question is not whether moral hazard due to the IMF’s safety
net is a necessary ingredient in ﬁnancial crises but, more broadly, what role
moral hazard plays in accounting for the existence and severity of the
crises we have seen. The historical evidence DeLong assembles in this
area of inquiry does little more than enable us to dismiss certain extrem-
ist views out of hand. But in an era when extremists on all sides increas-
ingly dominate the discussion, this, too, can be a useful service.
DeLong’s third conclusion, on the role of currency regimes, is also no
doubt true but of limited import. It is hard to dispute the claim that a system
in which countries credibly commit to maintain fixed values of their cur-
rencies against some well-established benchmark carries advantages from
the way market participants’ expectations affect their speculative behav-
ior. The character of those expectations, and hence the advantageous con-
sequences of the speculation to which they give rise, are simply assumed
once the word “credibly” is included. Nor is this idea new. The debate
over the classical gold standard has traditionally pitted just those advan-
tages against equally clear drawbacks. Most economists have concluded
that the drawbacks dominate. In any case, as DeLong makes clear, nobody
thinks that the countries at the heart of the recent wave of currency crises
could make such a credible commitment within the foreseeable future. 
There is an important nexus of interrelated issues that I believe should
now stand at the center of economists’agenda for research, historical and
other, on these matters. DeLong usefully points to questions about the
moral hazard created by, for example, the IMF’s safety net. To repeat, the
real question here is not what is a necessary or sufficient condition for
what, but rather how influential—quantitatively—such moral hazard is in
accounting for what seems to be going wrong. To put the question more
bluntly, and in a way that I think appropriately redirects attention in this
area away from its nearly exclusive focus on the borrowers, why have
international lenders been so reckless? For example, what were American
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Indonesian and Korean banks that were openly relending the proceeds in
rupiah and won without hedging the resulting currency exposure? That
they were relying on those countries’ governments to rescue their banks,
and in turn on the IMF to rescue the governments, is one possible answer.
But there are other possible answers, and the subject deserves a serious
and systematic examination.
It also helps, I think, to remind ourselves that many of these same
lenders sometimes act just as recklessly in contexts in which the IMF is
in no way involved. For example, what were many of these same bankers
thinking when they lent in sizable amounts to Long Term Capital Man-
agement, the widely touted hedge fund that collapsed so dramatically in
the fall of 1998, without receiving the right to know how the borrower
was using the proceeds, much less getting to audit or even inspect the
ﬁrm’s books? Here too, moral hazard created by central authority may, or
may not, have been an important part of the story. In the United States, in
principle, this particular kind of moral hazard should apply only to those
institutions deemed “too big to fail.” But in practice the too-big-to-fail
standard often seems highly elastic. 
A quite different view, which likewise applies in both domestic and
international contexts, attributes lenders’ systematic recklessness to the
competitive pressures bearing on ﬁnancial intermediaries (banks in partic-
ular) that look to speculative markets to provide the capital that constitutes
the raw material with which they conduct their business. U.S. banks long
ago lost the core commercial lending business that enabled them to earn a
rate of return that shareholders would see as competitive while assuming
only reasonable risk. Since then most have been driven to ﬁnd special mar-
ket niches, to seek sources of income outside of standard banking activities,
or—in all too many cases—to take on excessive risk. Is this story a good
one for other countries, too? Given that it is in no way inconsistent with a
role for moral hazard, what relative importance attaches to each?
Yet another potentially useful way to address some of the questions at
issue in DeLong’s paper would be to construct a historical counter-
factual—for example, in the mode of Robert Fogel’s study of nineteenth-
century American railroads—for specific episodes in recent or
not-so-recent experience.
2 For example, how much more (or less) would
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try’s government had simply defaulted on its foreign currency debt?
Answering such a question requires making strong assumptions, to be
sure. But as Fogel and others have shown in other areas of historical
inquiry, it is possible to make the needed assumptions in a sufﬁciently sen-
sible way that readers can draw useful lessons from the subsequent
analysis.
One can think of other approaches to posing the same set of questions.
One is to ask what is gained, and by whom—and what is lost, and by
whom—from maintaining the ﬁction that nobody defaults on debt owed to
the IMF, or to other ofﬁcial lenders for whom default is too embarrassing
to acknowledge. In effect, borrowers can and do default de facto, but they
are not allowed to do so de jure. Why?
Here again, the important issues are hardly limited to the international
arena. In an international context, however, special considerations apply
that make matters more complex. Perhaps the easiest way to see how these
special factors come to bear is to recall, by way of analogy, what happens
when the United States declares that it will not give aid to countries that
support terrorism, or fail to combat drug trafﬁcking, or do not comply with
other important priorities of American foreign policy. Too often, the result
is not that other countries change their behavior. Instead, the facts notwith-
standing, the U.S. government goes ahead and certiﬁes that such and such
a country is no longer sponsoring terrorism, or is waging the good fight
against the drug trade, when it is clear to everyone that this is not so. The
explanation, of course, is that reasons of state demand that aid to these
countries continue, and these reasons prevail.
The most recent potential example arose during the week this Brookings
Papers conference was held. The Secretary of the Treasury publicly stated
that the United States would support continued IMF lending to Russia only
if investigation shows recent allegations of embezzlement and money
laundering by Russian government officials to be false. It is not hard to
predict that whatever investigation ensues will, in due course, find these
allegations unfounded. (It is even possible to imagine a situation in which
some of the wrongdoers might demand yet additional payoffs in exchange
for not publicly acknowledging their own illicit activities.) Once a gov-
ernment, or any other institution, commits itself to any given fiction, it
acquires an interest in seeing that fiction maintained. The relevance of all
this to the set of issues raised by DeLong’s paper is that today the absence
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default on other forms, constitutes just such a fiction. It would be useful
to know of what value that fiction is, and to whom—and, importantly, at
what cost it comes. 
Economic history is not the only way to answer questions like these, but
I think DeLong is right to believe that the experience of longer ago than
just the last few crises may have something to tell us. 
General discussion: Christopher Carroll noted that advances in the evo-
lution of financial institutions, accounting standards, and laws to prevent
abuses and increase transparency have often come in response to crises. He
believed the paper could have more fully analyzed how past crises shaped
the attitudes and policies that followed them, and from that analysis could
have drawn lessons for today’s developing countries. In the same vein,
Christopher Sims suggested taking a closer look at how the United States
moved from a period of relative ﬁnancial instability in the nineteenth cen-
tury, through institutional reform, to the relative financial stability of the
post–World War II period. A particularly interesting episode took place in
the 1830s, when some American states defaulted on signiﬁcant quantities
of debt. In the wake of that crisis, foreign investors remained wary of lend-
ing to American governments until after the Civil War. Meanwhile states
undertook reform to various degrees, with some essentially repudiating
their debt and others paying its full present value. How quickly they could
return to the market seemed to depend on the amount of reform effort
they undertook. Sims reasoned that examining such past episodes should
help in the design of reforms today, when each crisis country cares
whether it can return to the capital markets in three years or ﬁfteen years.
Robert Hall did not accept the paper’s implicit message that crisis is
an intrinsic feature of economies. He reasoned that short-term debt expo-
sure lies behind crises and noted that, as a consequence, in the United
States only the financial sector is vulnerable. The nonfinancial sector is
overwhelmingly ﬁnanced with crisis-free equity. Regrettably, however, the
financial sector is more heavily leveraged with short-term debt than ever.
Hall noted that if Thai companies had been ﬁnanced with equity, that coun-
try would not suffered its recent crisis. At worst, there would have been a
sharp decline in the value of the equity, although even that would not have
been severe, because the endogenous crisis-producing mechanism that
develops with short-term debt would have been avoided. Hall concluded
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ﬁrst, to induce them to get rid of short-term debt, and replace it with Amer-
ican-style equity markets. Carroll added that it might be necessary to
export the entire institutional and legal framework associated with equity
holding in the United States. Without such a framework, it may not be a
good idea to buy equity in, say, an Indonesian company, given that the cur-
rent corporate governance regime there provides no reason to believe that
managers will act in the shareholders’interest.
David Laibson thought the paper provided a series of anecdotes about
extreme and spectacular failures, but little insight into how typical for-
eigners fared when they invested in the United States in the nineteenth cen-
tury. It would be interesting to know whether such investors should be
modeled as myopic agents making suboptimal decisions, or as rational
agents making sensible choices in an environment with extreme informa-
tion asymmetries and many institutional deﬁciencies.
Alan Blinder cautioned against viewing all financial crises as alike;
close attention should be paid to the details. He suggested that if Mexico
and East Asia had had floating exchange rates and much less foreign cur-
rency–denominated debt, the recent crises would have been much less
intense or would not have occurred at all. One of the lessons of the recent
crises was certainly that rapid financial liberalization without the appro-
priate regulatory apparatus in place is dangerous. Blinder added that moral
hazard is a continuous rather than a zero-one variable. It became a seri-
ous concern after the holders of Mexican tesobonos were fully bailed out,
and it is plausible that investors were more willing to lend in East Asia
after the Mexican experience. Richard Cooper disagreed, saying the
importance of the Mexican bailout was often overestimated. He found it
difﬁcult to believe that paying off lenders to the Mexican government, with
Mexico having just entered the North American Free Trade Agreement,
would have encouraged excessive lending to private companies in Asia.
Cooper also joined Carroll and Hall in their support for greater reliance
on equity and the American institutional framework, and pointed out that
since its crisis Korea has been converting corporate debt into equity.
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